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How did Ebola information spread on
twitter: broadcasting or viral spreading?
Hai Liang1,2, Isaac Chun-Hai Fung3,5,7†, Zion Tsz Ho Tse4†, Jingjing Yin3†, Chung-Hong Chan2, Laura E. Pechta6,
Belinda J. Smith8, Rossmary D. Marquez-Lameda6, Martin I. Meltzer5, Keri M. Lubell6 and King-Wa Fu2*
Abstract
Background: Information and emotions towards public health issues could spread widely through online social
networks. Although aggregate metrics on the volume of information diffusion are available, we know little about
how information spreads on online social networks. Health information could be transmitted from one to many (i.e.
broadcasting) or from a chain of individual to individual (i.e. viral spreading). The aim of this study is to examine the
spreading pattern of Ebola information on Twitter and identify influential users regarding Ebola messages.
Methods: Our data was purchased from GNIP. We obtained all Ebola-related tweets posted globally from March 23,
2014 to May 31, 2015. We reconstructed Ebola-related retweeting paths based on Twitter content and the follower-
followee relationships. Social network analysis was performed to investigate retweeting patterns. In addition to
describing the diffusion structures, we classify users in the network into four categories (i.e., influential user, hidden
influential user, disseminator, common user) based on following and retweeting patterns.
Results: On average, 91% of the retweets were directly retweeted from the initial message. Moreover, 47.5% of the
retweeting paths of the original tweets had a depth of 1 (i.e., from the seed user to its immediate followers). These
observations suggested that the broadcasting was more pervasive than viral spreading. We found that influential
users and hidden influential users triggered more retweets than disseminators and common users. Disseminators
and common users relied more on the viral model for spreading information beyond their immediate followers via
influential and hidden influential users.
Conclusions: Broadcasting was the dominant mechanism of information diffusion of a major health event on
Twitter. It suggests that public health communicators can work beneficially with influential and hidden influential
users to get the message across, because influential and hidden influential users can reach more people that are
not following the public health Twitter accounts. Although both influential users and hidden influential users can
trigger many retweets, recognizing and using the hidden influential users as the source of information could
potentially be a cost-effective communication strategy for public health promotion. However, challenges remain
due to uncertain credibility of these hidden influential users.
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Background
The outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014 received a dis-
proportionate amount of media coverage and public atten-
tion relative to the threat it posed to public health in the
United States [1, 2]. Mathematical models at the aggregate
level have been proposed to explain the contagion process of
the spread of information on social media [2]. However, a
more fundamental question remains unknown—how did
Ebola messages diffuse on social media platforms?
An understanding of how health information diffuses on
social media is essential for public health communication. A
central goal of health communication is to devise efficient
and effective ways to disseminate health information [3]. In
the pre-social media age, large-scale distribution of health in-
formation relied on broadcast media, such as newspaper and
television. Mass media or marketing efforts rely on what
might be termed a “broadcast” diffusion model, indicating
that a large number of individuals receive the information
directly from the same source [4].
However, Katz and Lazarsfeld [5] pointed out that inter-
personal communication plays an important role in mediat-
ing information flow between mass media and the public.
Because social media allows for interpersonal communica-
tion, online messages can go “viral” through a chain of
individual-to-individual diffusion process, analogous to the
spread of some infectious diseases. Although this “viral” dif-
fusion model could drive large-scale diffusion to reach a
large population, it is notable that the broadcast model of in-
formation diffusion still operates in social media. For ex-
ample, Goel et al. [4] found that popular tweets usually
spread through the “broadcast” diffusion model.
The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether
the broadcast model or the viral model dominated Ebola in-
formation diffusion on Twitter. Knowing these dynamics
could help public health communicators ensure messages
are reaching at-risk or affected groups. Specifically, if the
broadcast mechanism is dominant on social media, public
health practitioners should solicit support from key opinion
leaders, i.e., the most influential users, to pass on their public
health messages. On the contrary, if the viral mechanism is
dominant, public health practitioners should focus on the
structural characteristics of individuals’ social networks (e.g.
the cohesiveness of network members) [6]. In this sense, it is
important to identify the influential users who can trigger
large-scale information cascades, i.e., the users whose tweets
were frequently retweeted. Therefore, we introduce an estab-
lished method for classifying Twitter users (previously used
to study non-health-related communication [7]) in order to
identify influential users in the diffusion process of Ebola-re-
lated tweets.
Although previous studies have examined Twitter for
its information diffusion models and the identification of
influential users [4, 7], these patterns and users may vary
across topics. Whether the same findings would apply to
tweets related to health-related topics, such as Ebola, re-
mains unknown. Therefore, this study aims to bridge the
study of structural virality [4] and influential user identifica-
tion [7] in health message diffusion. Methodologically, we
propose a normalized structural virality measure as a modi-
fied version of the original measure of structural virality.
Theoretically, this study extends the study of information dif-
fusion at the aggregate level [2] to the investigation of
micro-diffusion processes and the analysis of influential user
types. This will advance our understanding of the differences
between broadcast and viral models.
Methods
Data collection
Our data was purchased from GNIP, the official provider of
Twitter data. We used the query “contains: ebola OR #ebola
OR ébola OR #ébola” to obtain the population of
Ebola-related tweets (including all retweets and replies)
posted globally from March 23, 2014 to May 31, 2015 (inclu-
sive). March 23, 2014 was chosen at the start date because it
was the day when CDC began its Ebola emergency response.
May 31, 2015 was the cut-off point when this data set was
purchased. We obtained 36,931,362 relevant tweets, which
were originated from all around the world and were publicly
available. On Twitter, an original tweet is a status posted dir-
ectly by the author. An original tweet can be retweeted
(shared) by any other users. A retweeted status is called a
retweet. The users who retweet the original tweets are retwe-
eters. Users can follow any other users, which we call follo-
wees. Users can receive all messages posted or retweeted by
their followees.
Of these relevant tweets, 52.3% (18,949,515) were ori-
ginal tweets. We limited our analyses to a subset of
192,209 original tweets and their retweets. Each of these
192,209 original tweets had more than 10 retweets. We
excluded the less popular tweets for two reasons: first,
short-lived tweets might result in isolated tweets that were
not connected to and were irrelevant to the core compo-
nents of a network; second, the complexity of the compu-
tational methods needed would be reduced. The 192,209
original tweets received a combined total of 12,426,623
retweets. Therefore, the combined total number of ori-
ginal tweets and retweets analyzed in this study was
12,618,832. The original tweets were posted by 56,768
unique handles (i.e., seed users), and the whole dataset
contained 4,925,730 unique handles (i.e., users).
Diffusion path and information cascade
A diffusion path is the chain of retweeting that fol-
lows the posting of an original tweet. It starts with a
“seed user” who sends it to their followers. For the
same seed message (i.e., the original tweet), a collec-
tion of all its diffusion paths is called an information
cascade. It can be represented graphically as a
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diffusion tree (Fig. 1). There are three metrics that
describe an information cascade, namely cascade
size, cascade scale and cascade depth (Table 1).
Reconstructing diffusion paths
To determine how Ebola messages spread on Twitter, we
first had to reconstruct the diffusion paths of Ebola-related
messages. Information diffusion on Twitter basically depends
on the “retweet” function. However, it is technically difficult
to trace these paths on Twitter. First, it requires the entire
population of retweets, which can only be obtained via pur-
chase from Twitter. Second, Twitter’s official application pro-
gramming interface (API) only returns the users who
originally posted the tweets rather than the users from whom
the retweeters directly retweeted.
For example, if retweeter B retweeted an original tweet
posted by the seed user via retweeter A whom retweeter B
followed (i.e., seed user to retweeter A to retweeter B), the
Twitter API returns “seed user to retweeter B.” To solve
this problem, we adopted an approach introduced in pre-
vious studies [8, 9] to reconstruct the diffusion paths. See
Fig. 2 for an illustration. We reconstructed the diffusion
paths of the 192,592 original tweets selected for the study.
Measuring broadcast or viral models
The key research question of this study is to quantify the
extent to which Ebola-related messages diffused through
the broadcast or viral model. This was determined by
calculating the structural virality and normalized struc-
tural virality for each information cascade.
Structural virality of a diffusion tree is defined as the
average “distance” between all pairs of retweeters
(known as “nodes” in network science) in the tree [4].
The distance between two nodes is the smallest number
of links connecting them. In Fig. 1, the distance between
A and B is 1, and the distance between B and D is 3 (B
to A, A to C, and C to D). We calculated the distance
between every pair of retweeters and averaged all dis-
tance values to provide a single estimate of structural
virality of each diffusion tree.
The structural virality of a diffusion tree approaches a
value of 2 when all retweets are directly retweeted from
the seed user, which indicates that no subsequent
spreading has occurred after the first generation. Struc-
tural virality reaches the maximum value when the tree
is a single chain. For any information cascade, the mini-
mum structural virality is 2 and the maximum structural
virality is proportional to the cascade size (see Add-
itional file 1). A large structural virality indicates the in-
formation cascade is likely to be a long chain and thus
follows the viral model.
Normalized structural virality. In order to interpret struc-
tural virality more intuitively, we propose a normalized ver-
sion of structural virality. We rescaled structural virality to
be a normalized variable ranging from 0 (purely broadcast)
to 1 (purely viral). In our analyses, we will report both the
raw and normalized measures. We provide the mathematical
details in Additional file 1.
User classification
In addition to describing the diffusion structures, we
identify the influential users in the information cascades.
To identify influential users, we first have to develop a
user classification scheme. Conventionally, influential
users are measured by their authority. There are two ap-
proaches in the literature to determine authority.
The first approach is to count the number of followers
a user has. In the parlance of network analysis, the au-
thority of a user is calculated by measuring one’s degree
centrality in a follower network [10] (Table 2). The
underlying assumption is that users with more followers
are more likely to be retweeted by others. However, this
approach ignores the impact of retweets. For example,
user A has 10 followers and user B has 100 followers.
All 10 followers of user A retweet user A’s tweets while
no follower of user B retweets user B’s tweets. If we sim-
ply use the number of followers (equivalent to the de-
gree centrality in a follower network) as a measure of
authority, we would have identified user B as more influ-
ential than user A because user B has more followers
than user A. However, user A may happen to be more
influential because user A’s tweets have been retweeted
by all of A’s followers.
Fig. 1 An example of information cascade and the key measures. In
this example, the cascade size is 8, the scale is 4/8 = 50%, and the
depth is 3
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Users with more followers could be considered more influ-
ential in facilitating information diffusion. However, influence
is domain specific. The first approach only accounts for fol-
lower network structure and is not informative enough to
determine who is more influential in the specific context of
Twitter communication pertinent to Ebola. While there is a
lot of potential for information diffusion given a large num-
ber of followers, it is unclear how that potential is realized.
The second approach to determine authority is to ac-
count for the retweeting patterns in addition to the
number of followers of the seed users. This approach
takes into account both the potential for information dif-
fusion offered by a follower network and the realization
of such a potential for information diffusion as observed
in the network pattern of retweets.
In this paper, we adopt the second approach. Follow-
ing this approach, we first classify users based on their
following and retweeting characteristics. Our user classi-
fication follows an established method proposed by
Gonzalez-Bailon, Borge-Hothoefer and Moreno [7]. A
brief explanation of the user classification method is pre-
sented in Table 3.
Disseminators receive fewer retweets than expected
based on their number of followers. Common users re-
ceived as few retweets as one would expect, given their
low number of followers. Influential users received as
many retweets as you would expect given their high
number of followers. Hidden influential users received
more retweets than expected.
In order to further explore the role of media related
accounts and health organization accounts, we followed
the method introduced in Towers et al. [2] to identify
media related accounts. First, we compiled a list of top
media organization accounts as documented in Towers
et al. [2]. Second, we used the keywords such as “media”
and “TV” to match Twitter’s screen names. For health
organizations, we compiled a list of 65 Twitter user
names, including NIH, UNICEF, UNMEER, Red Cross,
WHO, and all CDC affiliated accounts.
Statistical analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is information cascade,
which is composed of retweets, except for some analyses
related to user classification that are at the user level (i.e.,
unique Twitter handle). For the comparison between the
broadcast and viral diffusion models, we plotted the prob-
ability distribution of the normalized structural virality of
information cascades. We also calculated the means, me-
dians, and standard deviations of the cascade size, cascade
scale, cascade depth, and structural virality. If the cascade
scale is large, and cascade depth and structural virality
values are small, we can conclude that the broadcast
model is dominant, vice versa. All analyses in this part
were performed at the information cascade level with the
number of information cascades being 192,209.
In terms of user classification, we calculated the distri-
bution of the four user types over all users involved in
the information cascades in addition to the seed users
who initiated the information cascades. The unit of ana-
lysis is a unique user. That means we combined tweets
and retweets posted by the same user all together.
Table 1 Definition of three metrics that describe an information cascade
Metrics Definitions
Cascade size The number of total retweets received by an original tweet. The cascade size describes the popularity of the seed message
Cascade scale The percentage of all retweets that were retweeted directly from the original tweet. The higher the percentage is, the more likely the
diffusion cascade is dominated by the broadcast model
Cascade
depth
The number of generations in a diffusion path. A large depth value may suggest a long chain of information diffusion and thus
implies viral spreading
Fig. 2 An illustration of the reconstruction of a diffusion path. From
the Twitter API, we know that user A retweeted a message from
user C. User A follows 4 users: B1-B4. Among the followees, users B2
and B3 follow user C and retweeted the same message from user C
at time 1 and time 2 respectively. If time 1 is more recent than time
2, we will say that A retweeted C through B2 and information
diffused from C to A via B2
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To examine the relationships between structural virality
and user types, we calculated the medians, first, and third
quantiles of cascade depth, structural virality, and normal-
ized structural virality according to different user types of
the seed users. In addition, a cross-tab analysis based on
the 12,426,623 retweets was performed to examine the in-
formation flow between different user types (all involved
users). Since the distribution of the user types is not equal,
the expected values, i.e. the number of occurrence gener-
ated purely by chance, were calculated by (column sum ×
row sum)/total number of cases. For example, a large
number of retweets between common users is to be ex-
pected given the large number of common users in the
dataset. Only when the number of retweets larger than
the expected value, it indicates a significant tendency of
information flow between the user types.
Results
Broadcast versus viral diffusion
Our analyses were based on the 192,209 information cas-
cades of original tweets selected for the study. Given the na-
ture of highly skewed distributions, we present both mean
and median in the following section. The average cascade
scale percentage in our data is high (Mean, M= 90.7%, Me-
dian, Mdn= 98.4%, Standard Deviation, SD= 15.3%). Of the
12,426,623 retweets, 91% are directly retweeted from the
seed users. On average, the cascade depth of a typical diffu-
sion tree in our data is less than 3 (M= 2.57, Mdn= 2, SD=
3.62, Max = 139). Furthermore, 47.5% of the information cas-
cades have a depth of 1, while 70.7% have a depth of 2 or
less, and 82.5% have a depth of 3 or less.
Ebola information on Twitter spread mainly in a broadcast-
ing pattern, given the values of the scale and depth of informa-
tion cascades that we constructed from our data set. We
measured how information diffused in these information cas-
cades by using the normalized structural virality measure.
Across 192,209 information cascades, the average normalized
structural virality is 0.05 (Mdn=0.0006, SD= 0.12). For the
raw values, the mean is 2.27 (Mdn=1.98, SD= 1.23). Nearly
half (47.5%) of the cascades have a normalized structural viral-
ity of 0 (equivalent of having a raw value of structural virality
≈ 2), indicating a star network of retweets from the original
tweet but without any further retweets. Figure 3 depicts the
probability distribution of the normalized structural virality of
all 192,209 cascades. The highly skewed distribution indicated
that most cascades displayed broadcasting spreading diffusion,
whereas only a few displayed viral spreading diffusion.
The three indicators we measured are highly correlated.
First, the normalized structural virality and cascade scale are
negatively correlated (Spearman’s rho =− 0.98, p < .01). The
more structurally viral a cascade is, the less the tweet is being
retweeted by multiple users at the root of the diffusion tree
(for raw values, Spearman’s rho =− 0.92, p < .01). Second,
normalized structural virality and cascade depth are posi-
tively correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.92, p < .01). The more
structurally viral a cascade is, the more tweets are being
retweeted for multiple generations in a diffusion tree (for
raw values, Spearman’s rho = 0.92, p < .01). Third, cascade
scale percentage and cascade depth are negatively correlated
(Spearman’s rho =− 0.95, p < .01). The more users retweeted
the tweet at the root of the diffusion tree, the smaller is the
number of generations a tweet is retweeted in a diffusion
tree. Taken together, the three indicators consistently suggest
Table 2 Definitions of degree centrality and authority
Metrics Definitions
Degree
centrality
The total number of links of an individual in a network. In a network of followers, this will be the number of followers a user has
Authority The relative importance of a node in a network. In this paper, we measure the authority of a user by calculating the ratio of the
number of followees to the number of followers, and the ratio of the number of retweets received from others to the number of
retweets the user posted
Table 3 Two dimensions of authority and definitions of four
user types
First, we defined two dimensions of authority to classify users into four
categories (2 × 2):
a. Followee-follower ratio The first dimension is the ratio of
the number of followees to the
number of followers. Users are
classified as either ratio > 1 or ≤ 1.
b. Retweeted-retweeting ratio The second dimension is the ratio
of the number of retweets
received from others to the
number of retweets the user
posted. Users are classified as
either ratio > 1 or ≤ 1.
We expect that users, who have more followers than followees, should
have more retweets by their own followers than they retweeting their
followees’ tweets. Likewise, we expect that users, who have fewer
followers than followees, should have fewer retweets by their own
followers than they retweeting their followees’ tweets.
Therefore, according to the two dimensions, we defined four types of
users:
a. Disseminators (also named as
“Broadcasters” by Gonzalez-Bailon
et al. [7]
followees ≤ followers & being
retweeted ≤ retweeting
b. Common users followees > followers & being
retweeted ≤ retweeting
c. Influential users followees ≤ followers & being
retweeted > retweeting
d. Hidden influential users followees > followers & being
retweeted > retweeting
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that the broadcast model was dominant in the diffusion
process of Ebola messages on Twitter.
Furthermore, both the broadcast model and the viral
model could have generated large information cascades
as the normalized structural virality and cascade size are
only weakly correlated (Spearman’s rho = 0.08, p < .01).
Among the 10 most retweeted cascades (each with more
than 18,000 retweets), only two have normalized struc-
tural virality values larger than the median of 0.0006. In
fact, the relationship between normalized structural vir-
ality and cascade size is non-linear: Cascades with nor-
malized structural virality values around the median
(50–60%) received the largest number of retweets on
average (M = 170, Mdn = 76). The correlation between
raw structural virality and cascade size is stronger
(Spearman’s rho = 0.51, p < .01) than that between nor-
malized structural virality and cascade size, because the
average distance would be larger when there are more
retweeters solely by chance.
Identifying influential users
Number of followers ≠ influence. In the Ebola Twitter
conversation, the majority of users were simply recipi-
ents and did not retweet the message; only a few users
transmitted it by retweeting the message. In our data,
the number of followers is moderately correlated with
the number of retweets (Spearman’s rho = 0.28, p < .01),
suggesting that equating the number of followers to in-
fluence is questionable. In fact, the most retweeted tweet
in our data was posted by a user who had only 2421 fol-
lowers at the time. Among the top 10 retweeted tweets,
two were posted by users with fewer than 1000 fol-
lowers. The average number of followers the authors of
the original tweets that started the 192,209 information
cascades had was 464,700 (Mdn = 30,910, and 75% of
the users have more than 4077 followers).
To better measure the influence of Twitter users, we
used an established method [7] that combines following
and retweeting characteristics. Users who have more fol-
lowers than followees are expected to have more potential
to be retweeted and they are expected to be retweeted by
their own followers more than they retweet others’ tweets.
However, as shown in Table 4, only a small proportion of
all users involved in the information cascades (2%) were
retweeted as many times as expected (i.e., influential
users), and the rest (38%) were retweeted less often than
expected (i.e., “disseminators” as previously defined).
Users with fewer followers than followees are generally
expected to be less influential and be retweeted less
often than they retweet others’ tweets. Most of such
users (60% of all users) were less retweeted by their own
followers as compared to how many times they retweet
others’ tweets (i.e., common users). Nevertheless, a tiny
proportion of users (< 1% of all users in our data set) re-
ceived more retweets than they retweeted others’ tweets
while they have fewer followers than followees. Thus
they are categorized as “hidden influential users”.
Among the 56,768 seed users who created the information
cascades, 1.7% are disseminators, 1.4% are common users,
13.7% are hidden influential users, and 83.2% are influential
users. Table 5 shows that most information cascades were
initiated by the influential users (91.6%), while only 1% were
from common users and disseminators. The most active
Twitter account was Nigeria Newsdesk (created 1657 cas-
cades with more than 10 retweets), followed by World
Health Organization (created 1309 cascades) and BBC News
Fig. 3 The probability distribution of normalized structural virality of information cascades of 192,209 original tweets with more than 10 retweets
each, selected from a data set of 36,931,362 Ebola-related tweets from March 23, 2014 to May 31, 2015
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Africa (created 1027 cascades). All media related accounts
(e.g., CNN, BBC, and New York Times) created 8.2% (15,709)
information cascades and 94.7% (1068/1128) of these accounts
were influential users. Nevertheless, only 2.4% of influential
seed users were media related accounts. Health organization
accounts created 2.1% (4080) information cascades and all the
18 health organization seed accounts were influential users.
The media and health organization accounts triggered 12.8%
of all retweets in our data set. In summary, although the
media and health organization accounts were influential users,
they accounted for only a small proportion of the cascade dy-
namics directly. Many other Twitter users, who served as in-
fluential users, triggered most information cascades.
Table 5 also presents the cascade size, structural virality
and normalized structural virality of the 192,209 informa-
tion cascades. Influential users and hidden influential
users are more likely to trigger large cascades than dis-
seminators and common users. We observed that both in-
fluential users and hidden influential users were likely to
initiate information cascades that diffused through the
broadcast model, while disseminators and common users
were more likely to initiate information cascades that dif-
fused through the viral model.
Table 6 presents the retweeting patterns among the
four types of users involved in all information cascades
(4,925,730 unique users and 12,426,623 retweets). The
rows of Table 6 are the sources of information, while the
columns are the recipients. The information flows from
the rows to the columns. The values in the cells are the
numbers of retweets. The expected values, indicating the
number of occurrence generated purely by chance (assuming
that rows and columns are independent), were calculated by
(column sum × row sum)/total number of cases. For
example, the value in row 1 and column 4 is 58,203, indicat-
ing that the influential users have retweeted 58,203 times
from the disseminators. The observed value is larger than
the expected value (shown in parentheses, 16,385), indicating
that the probability of information flowing from dissemina-
tors to influential users (13.8%) is larger than the probability
of information flowing at random (3.9%).
The data in Table 6 suggest that Ebola-related messages
generally spread from the influential users to common users
and disseminators, accounting for 86.2% (10,709,045/
12,426,623) of all retweets. However, comparing to the ex-
pected values, the frequencies are somehow as expected. An-
other more significant route is messages flowing from
common users and disseminators to influential users and
hidden influential users, and then spread to the rest of the
common users. This explains why the information cascades
initiated by disseminators and common users have higher
structural virality values (see Table 2). This is also consistent
with the two-step flow theory as proposed by Katz and
Lazarsfeld [5]: common users rely on the opinion leaders
(i.e., the influential users or hidden influential users) to
spread information widely.
Discussion
Principal results
Our study investigated how Ebola-related information dif-
fused on Twitter using concepts from network analysis. We
demonstrated the coexistence of two diffusion models of
Ebola-related information on Twitter. The broadcast model
represents one-to-many diffusion, while the viral model rep-
resents a chain of individual-to-individual diffusion. We
found that the broadcast model was dominant in
Ebola-related Twitter communication. Like the viral model,
Table 4 Number of Twitter users (percentage of all users, n = 4,925,730) in four categories defined according to the following and
retweeting characteristics of the users who tweeted about Ebola from March 23, 2014 to May 31, 2015
One’s tweets being retweeted ≤ Retweeting others’ tweets One’s tweets being retweeted > Retweeting others’ tweets
Followees ≤
Followers
Disseminators
1,864,885 (38%)
Influential Users
88,286 (2%)
Followees >
Followers
Common Users
2,952,331 (60%)
Hidden Influential Users
20,228 (< 1%)
Note: “Followees” refers to the number of Twitter accounts that a Twitter user followed. “Followers” refers to the number of Twitter users who followed a Twitter
user’s account. “One’s tweets being retweeted” refers to the number of times a Twitter user’s tweet was retweeted by others. “Retweeting others’ tweets” refers to
the number of times a Twitter user retweeted another users’ tweets
Table 5 Cascade size, structural virality and normalized structural virality of information cascades created by four different categories
of users who tweeted about Ebola from March 23, 2014 to May 31, 2015
Categories of users who created the
information cascades
Percentage of total
cascades
Cascade size (Q1,
median, Q3)
Structural virality (Q1,
median, Q3)
Normalized structural virality (Q1,
median, Q3)
Influential users 91.6% (14, 21, 42) (1.89, 1.98, 2.15) (0.00, 0.00, 0.04)
Hidden influential users 7.1% (13, 17, 26) (1.93, 2.09, 2.61) (0.01, 0.04, 0.15)
Disseminators 0.6% (12, 13, 16) (1.92, 2.15, 2.64) (0.01, 0.09, 0.23)
Common users 0.7% (12, 14, 18) (1.98, 2.28, 2.86) (0.04, 0.13, 0.27)
Note: Q1: First quartile (25%); Q3: Third quartile (75%). See the User classification section in the Methods for the definition of disseminators, common users,
hidden influential users, and influential users
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the broadcast model could also generate large information
cascades. Furthermore, we found that influential users and
hidden influential users could trigger more retweets than dis-
seminators and common users. Disseminators and common
users primarily spread information via the broadcast model.
The disseminators’/common users’ tweets reached their fol-
lowers, but only a small fraction of their followers retweeted
them. If disseminators and common users were going to
spread information beyond their immediate followers, they
relied on influential and hidden influential users to retweet
their tweets. If many of a disseminator’s /common user’s fol-
lowers were influential or hidden influential users, then viral
spreading might occur. The influential users retweeted the
disseminator’s/common user’s tweets and then reached all of
their followers. In this sense, it starts as a broadcast model
(one-to-many) and then turns into a viral model (a chain of
individual-to-individual).
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several
ways. First, a previous study found that news media coverage,
instead of individual-to-individual communication, domi-
nated the dynamic patterns of Ebola-related Twitter activity
in the US [2]. Our finding is consistent with their mathemat-
ical model in general – broadcast model is pervasive. How-
ever, our analysis at the micro diffusion level suggests that
viral spreading still has its unique roles. Even though main-
stream media and health organization accounts (such as
BBC, CDC, and WHO) were very influential in terms of trig-
gering information cascades, most influential users were not
media or health organizations. They could be celebrities (e.g.,
Barack Obama, Bill Gates) or sports organizations (e.g., FC
Barcelona). In fact, the media accounts could only account
for a small proportion of all retweets in our data set. The dis-
crepancy could be caused by the units of analysis. Towers et
al.’s analyses [2] were at the aggregate level and the impact of
media coverage was estimated including indirect effects. It is
plausible that most of the celebrities or sports organizations
in our data set actually were led by media coverage; however,
the effect was not visible on Twitter. Second, our analysis
was not limited to the differentiation of broadcast or viral
diffusion models on Twitter. We introduced the
identification of influential users [7] to extend previous stud-
ies on Ebola-related Twitter data. We found that broadcast
and viral models were effective for different user types. Influ-
ential users and hidden influential users were more likely to
create broadcast diffusion, whereas common users and dis-
seminators were more likely to create viral diffusion. Finally,
extending the concept of structural virality introduced by
Goel et al. [4], we developed a normalized version of struc-
tural virality. The normalized structural virality will not de-
pend on the cascade size intrinsically and can be used to
analyze information cascades of all types of information
across different social media platforms.
Our findings are important as they may inform how we
may formulate public health communication strategy during
outbreak emergency responses. If a certain type of informa-
tion is more likely to diffuse via the broadcast model, it could
be strategically advantageous to work with influential users
and hidden influential users who can attract a large number
of retweeters directly. However, if the information is more
likely to spread virally, developing a successful strategy gets
more complicated because viral diffusion depends on the
structure of the underlying social networks. For example, in-
formation in a cohesive network – where users are
well-connected with each other – spreads relatively fast [11].
One strategy for health communication would then be to
identify cohesive sub-communities within a network and
then spread the information in each sub-community. How-
ever, we usually do not know the whole network structure
on social media platforms and therefore, the identification of
sub-communities within a network may not be feasible.
Through a retrospective observational study of Ebola-re-
lated Twitter data, our analysis showed that the broadcasting
model was dominant on Twitter for tweets pertinent to an
emerging infectious disease outbreak, and that the broadcast-
ing model could generate large information cascades. This
finding suggests that public health practitioners may be able
to rely on the broadcasting model for large-scale dissemin-
ation of public health information during outbreak emer-
gency responses. Although it is widely believed that the viral
spreading model is popular on Twitter, it is not empirically
Table 6 Information flow, as represented by frequencies of retweets and the expected numbers in bracket, among four categories
of Twitter users who tweeted about Ebola from March 23, 2014 to May 31, 2015
From-To Disseminators Common users Hidden influential users Influential users
Disseminators 199,167
(166,838)
146,719
(233,779)
19,182
(6269)
58,203
(16,385)
Common users 82,712
(115,082)
143,088
(161,257)
29,119
(4324)
37,046
(11,302)
Hidden influential users 174,208
(214,220)
306,596
(300,172)
28,480
(8049)
34,196
(21,039)
Influential users 4,442,035
(4,401,982)
6,267,010
(6,168,205)
107,264
(165,403)
351,598
(432,317)
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the expected values. The cells where empirical values are larger than the expected values are written in italics. The
expected numbers were calculated by cross-tabulation analysis by assuming columns and rows are independent. The analysis was based on the
12,426,623 retweets
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supported in our analysis of Ebola-related tweets. Viral infor-
mation cascades on Twitter are rare events that public health
agencies would not build communication strategies around
them.
Given that the Twitter handles of many established pub-
lic health agencies have more followers than followees,
these Twitter handles are either “disseminators” or “influ-
ential users.” The practical question raised by health com-
munication practitioners is how they can turn their
Twitter handles from “disseminators” to “influential users”
by attracting more retweets. Given the pervasiveness of
the broadcasting model as observed in the retweeting pat-
terns of Ebola-related tweets, establishing a large follower
base (as did many CDC Twitter handles) appears to the
most straight forward answer.
However, an outstanding question remains: how can we
communicate our health messages to Twitter users who
have no interest to follow public health agencies’ handles?
If the broadcast model of information diffusion prevails,
public health agencies’ messages would hardly ever reach
these Twitter users. Our results suggest that future efforts
would need to be able to identify seed users who have the
ability to trigger large-scale information cascades. Our
findings suggest that influential users and hidden influen-
tial users are likely to be the most important seeds. How-
ever, to collaborate with the influential users with many
followers (such as celebrities) to support the cause of a
specific health communication campaign may not always
be the public health agencies’ priorities.
Hidden influential users would be the alternatives, as
they can induce large-scale cascades beyond our expect-
ation. However, another set of questions emerge: (a)
How can we identify these hidden influential users? Can
they be identified prospectively? (b) What make these
Twitter users “hidden influential”? Are these users ne-
cessarily individuals or organizations with whom public
health agencies should engage?
Classification of Twitter users in Table 4 is retrospective in
general; however, knowledge gained from a previous out-
break may be applied to any current outbreak emergencies.
However, further validations are required in future studies to
ascertain user classification. The prospective identification of
hidden influential users at the early stage of the communica-
tion process and the subsequent collaboration with them to
propagate health messages are possible in theory but challen-
ging in practice given the amount of work that is required to
perform such analysis. The nature of the “hidden influential
users” also requires our attention. Did they simply by chance
write an Ebola-related tweet that became viral? Or are they
individuals who are masters of online communication and
can write tweets in a way that health organizations cannot?
Published scholarly literature on Ebola-related Twitter data
provides some insights into these highly viral tweets and
who these “hidden influential users” are. Vorovchenko and
colleagues [12] found that “humorous accounts” had a lot of
engagement during the Ebola crisis, especially during
October 2014 when Ebola cases were diagnosed in the
United States. Our team’s own qualitative analysis also found
that about one in four Ebola-related tweets in our dataset
was either a joke or irrelevant to public health (unpublished
data). Prior research on Twitter data pertinent to the 2009
H1N1 pandemic also identified humorous tweets in 8% of
their sample [13]. The “hidden influential users” identified
in our current study might be individuals who wrote jokes
about Ebola on Twitter. These humorous tweets reso-
nated with the emotions of many Twitter users at a junc-
ture when many Americans were anxious about their own
perceived risk of being infected with Ebola, and these
tweets became viral. However, whether public health
agencies should use humor in their Twitter communica-
tion to enable their tweets having a viral effect is a matter
subject to debate. Given that the reputation of the govern-
ment and the public health sector at large is at stake,
health communicators are likely to exercise extreme cau-
tion as they approach this suggestion.
It is worth noting that the time frame of 435 days of
our data surpasses many published analyses of
Ebola-related tweets. As highlighted in a 2016 review,
the vast majority of published Ebola-related social media
studies were analyses of data from a very short time
frame [14]. As described by Fung et al. and Towers et al.
[1, 2], Twitter users’ attention to the West African Ebola
outbreak were minimal prior to Ebola cases in the U.S.
and their interest in this topic dropped off afterwards.
While the cut-off point of May 31, 2015 was arbitrary
(as the data was purchased in early June, 2015), our ana-
lysis encompassed the Ebola-related Twitter activities
before, during and after the waves of attention to this
topic that was prominent in October 2014.
Limitations and future directions
First, the present study found that there is little differ-
ence between broadcasting and viral spreading models
in terms of the number of retweets received. However, it
remains unknown whether there are differences in terms
of “reach” (the potential number of individuals exposed
to the message), attitudes, and behavioral change. For
example, some scholars claimed that interpersonal com-
munication is more effective for behavioral change [6].
In addition, the “homophily” mechanism makes similar
users gather together [15]; for example, users who follow
CDC official account on Twitter (@CDCgov) may be
more similar to each other than those who do not. In
this way, broadcasting may reach similar users, whereas
viral spreading may reach heterogeneous users across
different communities on social media platforms [8]. In
this sense, although broadcast model is predominant,
viral spreading may be more beneficial for reaching
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diverse users. However, the lack of demographic data
pertinent to Twitter users prevent us from further
knowing the user diversity, and thereby limits the
generalizability and interpretability of the findings.
Second, this is a case study of Twitter information specific
to Ebola. Our findings are consistent with previous studies
using general tweets [4]. However, it is unknown whether
the patterns will hold across different topics. For example,
does Zika-related information diffuse on Twitter differently
than that of Ebola-related information [16]? Following a
similar line of thought, while prior cross-sectional studies
categorized contents Ebola-related tweets and manually
identified Ebola misinformation [17], future research may
study whether Ebola-related misinformation spreads differ-
ently on Twitter networks compared with correct scientific
information. Prior study has identified a difference between
the response ratio of Twitter users (the number of individ-
uals exposed to a piece of information divided by the num-
ber of individuals taking the action to retweet it or choosing
not to retweet it) for 3 news stories and 10 rumors related to
Ebola [18]. In terms of prevalence, structural virality, spread,
retweets, and other quantitative measures, are there any sig-
nificant differences between misinformation and scientific in-
formation? A study of publicly available Facebook data
found that scientific information differed from conspiracy
theories in terms of cascade dynamics [19]. Addressing these
issues will allow public health communicators to identify and
address misinformation.
Third, even though identifying the hidden influential
users to assist in the diffusion of public health messages
on Twitter could potentially be more effective than en-
couraging influential users to share critical public health
information, we employed an ad-hoc approach to identify
them in the current study. Can we identify hidden influen-
tial users on Twitter (or other social media) prior to or
during an emergency response? In this study, we identified
many media and health organizations that were influential
users. However, we also found that most of influential
users were not media or health organizations. Future stud-
ies are required to find a more convenient and efficient
way to identify hidden influential users.
Finally, the present study found that the broadcast-
ing model was dominant among Ebola-related tweets.
However, we do not know whether the combination
of broadcasting and viral spreading strategies can fa-
cilitate the diffusion of health information beyond the
additive effect.
Conclusions
Through an analysis of a comprehensive Twitter data
set, we explicitly reconstructed and described the dif-
fusion paths of Ebola-related messages. We demon-
strated that the broadcast model of one-to-many
dissemination dominated the Ebola discussion on
Twitter. Furthermore, we discussed the role of differ-
ent user types in the diffusion process. A few influen-
tial and hidden influential users played the key role
in successful diffusion of Ebola-related messages.
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